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CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY IN PENSION FUNDING
This paper considers dynamic efficiency and income distribution using an overlapping genera-
tion model of economic growth. The issues discussed within this framework intend to shed light on
an ongoing debate in most developed countries: the reform in funding the retirement pension
schemes. Private saving or compulsory distribution of income working independently of one another
cannot achieve optimality. A flexible framework for policy action hinges on providing a mix of pri-
vate saving and the adequate share of state sponsored security system.
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1. Introduction
There is a lot of pressure in most developed countries to reform the funding of the
pension scheme. The actual state sponsored redistribution pension system has come
under strong criticism for the loss of its efficiency due to an aging and slowly growing
population. In such a system, one would argue that there is an increasing burden put
on the contribution of the young working population in funding the old and retired.
The opponents to the actual pay-as-you-go system advocate the shift to private saving,
and pension financing through trust funds, as to avoid the working population paying
for the others.
This simplified reasoning involves a flaw. One can argue that in either system the
pension payments will involve tapping into the national product of the same period.
The working population will always provide the needs of the old generation by pro-
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ductive activity during the same period. The saving used in today’s production activi-
ties is recovered (by savers) from tomorrow’s output which is carried out by tomor-
row’s working population. Contrary to common belief, the saving payments made to
pension funds are not stocked or “stowed” away from economic activity because na-
tional income is a flow variable realized in each period. An amount of capital invested
today will grow only if there is a working population in the next period. No matter
which system is at work, no generation does in fact fund its own retirement scheme.
This paper aims to address these issues in a simple and unified framework. A one-
commodity “Diamond” [9] type life-cycle model is selected for this purpose. This
choice is the one commonly used (but not exclusively) by the growing literature dealing
with the subject. These models often consider a second asset, money, and feature multi-
ple equilibria. From a quick survey, the main conclusions we draw are the following
1:
when capital accumulation is insufficient, increasing the saving invested in the financial
market will boost economic growth. One can then argue that shifting to less pay-as-you-
go funding, and therefore an increased share of pension financing through trust funds is
a desirable outcome for growth. This proposition is valid when the constant rate of
growth is driven by exogenous factors, such as technical progress, without any consid-
eration of economic policy. Extending Romer’s work [10], endogenous growth models
dealing with the subject lead to ambiguous conclusions [1]. Concerning welfare out-
comes, most models tend to prove that pay-as-you-go pension schemes are non-optimal,
whereas empirical contributions suggest the opposite [5].
With the overlapping generation model as a framework, the paper argues that the
debate opposing two financing pension systems is somewhat misleading. Neither pri-
vate saving alone nor the pay-as-you-go pension funding can achieve optimality. By
an adequate interpretation of the Golden Rule steady state, it is shown that the latter
hinges on an intergeneration distribution mechanism. This outcome is feasible
through a “Rousseau” type of “social contract” linking the old generation to the
young one. When such solidarity cannot be accounted for, a distribution mechanism
must then be implemented. In the Golden Rule steady state, welfare is optimal in both
senses: the intertemporal spread of consumption is maximized over the life cycle of
an individual, as well as the consumption of both generations over the same period.
These conclusions lead to another result: an individual is indifferent as to the funding
of the retirement pension system. One cannot choose one system or the other as the
rate of return of the intergeneration distribution mechanism is equal to the rate of
return of private saving. Therefore comparing pension systems in the Golden Rule
steady state is misleading. We can, however, show that for all feasible steady states,
the inequality between the two rates of return can go either way indicating a prefer-
ence for one funding method over the other. This is a good indication for implement-
ing economic policy. Private saving or compulsory distribution of income working
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independently of one another cannot achieve optimality. Therefore funding the re-
tirement scheme exclusively by the distribution mechanism is not optimal because
capital accumulation is always driven by private saving.
A flexible framework for policy action hinges on providing a mix of private saving
and the adequate share of intergeneration distribution of income. By introducing
a taxation/distribution mechanism, the paper shows that when “over-accumulation”
prevails and therefore the programme is consumption-inefficient, then the pay-as-you-
go pension scheme helps to absorb excess saving. The policy should adjust the
intergeneration transfer of income from the young towards the old. When capital ac-
cumulation is insufficient, the programme is consumption-efficient, but falls short of
its Golden Rule value, then economic policy acts as to boost the insufficient saving.
The conclusion now features a transfer of wealth in the opposite direction. Taxing the
income of the old generation will improve capital accumulation and increase welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the life cycle model. Section 3 is
a reminder of the Golden Rule and consumption-efficiency. In Section 4, the main
results are discussed. The concluding section examines some of the implications in
modelling behaviour in a dynamic setting.
2. The model
2.1. Intertemporal maximization behaviour
Let us consider a discrete-time life-cycle model when individuals live exactly two
periods and maximize their intertemporal utility function. At any period of time, there
are two types of consumers : the “young” and the “old”. For simplicity , we assume
that the utility function is of the Cobb–Douglas type :
, ) , (
1
2 1 2 1
β β − = c c c c U  and  1 0 < < β  (1)
where c1 and c2 stand for consumption during the first and second periods, respec-
tively.
We also assume, on the supply side, a single good competitive economy. Output is
produced by a constant return to scale technology, satisfying all the Inada regularity
conditions.
The intensive form of the production function, relating the per capita output y to
the capital–labor ratio k, is given by:  ) (k f y =  with a positive, but decreasing mar-
ginal product of capital  0 ) ( > ′ k f  and  0 ) ( < ′ ′ k f .
Without loss of generality, we consider a Cobb–Douglas production function such
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At any period, there are two overlapping generations, the young active workers
















During the first period of his/her life, while being young, a worker’s only source of in-
come is his/her wage which depends on the capital–labor ratio of the first time period:
) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 k f k k f w ′ − = . ( 3 )
This worker consumes c1 and saves s1; so, s1 = w1 – c1. This saving is invested and
earns a yield equal to the marginal product of capital of the next period. Bequest con-
siderations are ignored such that the individual’s consumption, while being old and
retired, equals the income of this second period:  ). ( 2 1 2 k f s c ′ =
For simplicity we consider a circulating-capital model. With the rate of deprecia-
tion of capital equal to 1, the net marginal product (of capital) is equal to the com-
modity interest rate:
2 2 1 ) ( r k f = − ′ , or also  ) 1 ( ) ( 2 2 r k f + = ′ .( 4 )
Therefore, the second period consumption is:  ) 1 ( 2 1 2 r s c + = .
Solving the life-cycle utility maximization problem (Problem I)
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subject to the income constraints:
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yields the solution of the optimal saving rate:
1 1 ) 1 ( w s β − = .( 5 )
This is a linear function which depends exclusively on the first period income: the
exogenously given wage rate. It is therefore independent of the expected income of
the second period.
2.2. Capital accumulation and the steady state
We now turn to the capital accumulation dynamics when individuals have a saving
behaviour, for all future generations, as the one described above. We postulate a con-
stant growth rate “n” of the population such that:
t t L n L ) 1 ( 1 + = + .( 6 )
Accordingly, total saving, for any time period, is given by:
1 1 1 1 1
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This saving is converted through investment to form the capital used during the

















Reverting to the per capita production function (equation (2)), we can write the
wage rate (equation (3)) as:
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This is a simple nonlinear difference equation in  t k  for this perfectly competitive
model with perfect foresight and intertemporal utility maximization by economic
agents. It may readily be shown that the capital–labor ratio k, starting from any initial
condition k0, converges to its steady state value 
* k  as  ∞ → t :
= = ∞ →
* lim k kt t
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Because the model is stable, the interest rate also converges to its steady state
value. Using equation (4):  1 ) ( − ′ = t t k f r , enables us to set:
1
) 1 )( 1 (
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Does this capital accumulation process yield a steady state which is consumption-
inefficient, in the sense that everyone can be made better off by having higher con-
sumption in every time period? Equation (10) has a key role in providing an answer to
such a question. Before doing so, let us turn briefly to discussing the problem under-
lying the consumption-inefficient outcome.Capital accumulation ... 45
3. The Golden Rule and the consumption efficiency
3.1. Capital accumulation and consumption-efficiency
The concept of economic efficiency we are looking at here involves comparison of
alternative consumption paths over an infinite time horizon.
For models with one primary factor–labor- (and excluding joint production) and
constant returns to scale, the steady-state equilibrium value of every variable may be
regarded as a function of the steady-state commodity interest rate. This result follows
from P. Samuelson’s Non-substitution Theorem. Thus in a world of identical well-
behaved preferences, it is quite a general proposition to write per capita utility as
a function of the interest rate:  ) (r u u = .
In a one-commodity model, consumption is the difference between output and in-
vestment. Per capita consumption is given by its steady state expression as:
k n k f c ) 1 ( ) ( + − = , where k is the steady state value of the capital–labor ratio (we also
assume a depreciation rate equal to 1).
So,  ) (r k k =  and  )]] ( [ [ r k c u u = .
From among all stationary states, how can we select those capital accumulation
programs that increase utility, or better, provide the highest level of welfare?
The behaviour of u(r) is seen by calculating:
=
dr
r du ) (













Combining the regularity conditions;  0 , 0 < ′ ′ > ′ f u  with equation (4):
r k f = − ′ 1 ) ( , leads to the following result:
) sgn( sgn n r
dr
du
− − = , across steady state equilibria.
– Utility deriving from consumption is maximised if r = n. This is the Golden Rule
of capital accumulation.
– What can we say when r > n? In this one commodity model, saving and capital
accumulation are identical, therefore lower values of the interest rate are unambigu-
ously associated with higher values of the steady-state capital–labor ratio k (recall that
) (k f ′  is a decreasing function of k). Thus for r > n, smaller values of r also imply
higher levels of utility, as shown in Fig. 3. Therefore, this program is said to be con-
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– For r < n, there is already too much saving. Therefore additional saving which
implies still lower values of r and larger values of k, results in decreasing the steady-
state level of utility, as Fig. 3 shows. There is over-accumulation due to excess saving,
so the steady state is consumption-inefficient.
0
n r < n r > n r =
Fig. 3
The Golden Rule of capital accumulation serves as a benchmark to distinguish
between the steady states equilibria having “too much” capital and those that do not.
A programme is consumption-inefficient if r < n.
3.2. Consumption-inefficiency in the life-cycle model
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A simple numerical example suggests that if 
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From the utility function in equation (1) as well as from equation (5), β  is the
fraction of the wage income devoted to consumption during the first period of an in-
dividual’s life cycle. Consumption-inefficiency is due to excess saving. This is an
important conclusion in the sense that we must recognize the theoretical possibility
that dynamic inefficiency occurs despite perfect competition and intertemporal utility
maximization in a perfect foresight world.
In a more practical sense, the result points out the possibility of consumption-
inefficiency when agents rely on private saving to pay for consumption during their
old age period of life.
Is there an alternative way to transfer wealth that provides a consumption-efficient
steady state?
4. The intergeneration distribution solution
4.1. The Golden Rule and welfare criterion
The most frequently used criterion to evaluate welfare in an overlapping genera-
tion model is given by P. Samuelson [12]. It suggests choosing from among feasible
stationary states the one that maximizes intertemporal utility. What is in fact sug-
gested is an intergeneration distribution mechanism.
To see this, let us write the maximization problem:  ) , ( max 2 1 c c U  subject to the
constraint of the equation of balance between output, on the one hand, and consump-
tion and investment, on the other, as:
1 2 1 1
1
+ −
− + + = t t t t t t t K c L c L L K
α α ,
or in per capita form:
t t t t c
n
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α .
This is the balance between the net product and the consumption of the “young”
and “old” generations at any period in time.
In steady state  1 + = t t k k . Aggregate per capita consumption is given by the steady-
state net output:  . ) 1 ( k n k c + − =
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Let us consider the transfer of income between generations. We assume that every
young worker is given the net output:  k n k ) 1 ( + −
α .
Let us also assume that this representative agent is willing to transfer to the retired
generation an amount equal to γ  such that any old individual acquires:  γ ) 1 ( n + .
While being young any individual’s consumption possibilities are given by:
c1 + γ = k
α – (1 + n)k.
Once retired, he/she will benefit from transfers made by the younger generation.
His/her consumption is then equal to:  γ ) 1 ( 2 n c + = . Therefore, at any period in time
along a steady state, per capita consumption in the economy is still given by the net
per capita output:
k n k c
n
c c ) 1 (
1
1




Therefore, Samuelson’s criterion scales down to choose the capital–labor ratio k
that maximizes net product and then select the best intergeneration distribution pat-
tern.




















In addition, the maximized net output is given by 
α α k ) 1 ( − , when k is set equal to k
**.
Selecting the distribution pattern is equivalent to maximizing welfare subject to
the optimally chosen net output, that is:
β β − =
1
























Equation (12) is an individual intertemporal maximization condition as well as an
optimal intergeneration distribution rule. We can readily provide a solution for con-
sumption and for the distribution parameter γ as:
α α β k c ) 1 ( 1 − = ,  
α α β k n c ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( 2 + − − =  and  
α α β γ k ) 1 )( 1 ( − − = . (13)Capital accumulation ... 49
This outcome is feasible through a “Rousseau” type of “social contract” linking
the “young” and “old” generations. When such solidarity between generations does
prevail, then some sort of regulation must be implemented by public intervention in
the distribution mechanism. This can be obtained through a compulsory pay-as-you-
go pension policy.
Comparing this solution with the one obtained with the private saving capital–la-
bor ratio of equation (9), we can readily notice that:
,








which is equivalent to r = n, precisely the Golden Rule condition for capital accumu-
lation.
The distribution mechanism based on the intergeneration transfer of income at any
time is optimal only if the capital–labor ratio maximizes net per capita output. The
latter depends on the saving rate and we know from the earlier discussion that private
saving behaviour does not necessarily lead to the Golden Rule capital–labor ratio.
Funding the retirement scheme exclusively by the distribution mechanism is not opti-
mal because capital accumulation is determined by private saving. Therefore, any
system, private saving or compulsory distribution of income, working independently
of one another cannot achieve the Golden Rule steady state.
4.2. Alternative pension systems and the individual choice
Let us consider an individual who is free to choose between alternative pension
systems. He/she can either rely exclusively on private saving or pay a contribution τ
taken from his/her first period wage, and receive a pension θ2 when retired.
If we assume, for simplicity, that his/her first period consumption  c c = 1  is exoge-
nous, the economic agent will only care about the expected consumption of the sec-
ond period of his/her life cycle while choosing between the two systems, that is:
)] , ( [ max 2 1 c c U E , with  c c = 1  exogenous, is equivalent to  )] ( [ max 2 c V E .
Even without a second asset in the economy, such as money, the consumer problem
scales down to a portfolio choice. He/she will compare the rate of return of private sav-
ing to that of the distribution pension in order to make a decision (Problem II):
)] ( [ max 2 c V E ,
subject to:
1 1 1 ) 1 ( s w c − − = τ ,
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where 
e
2 θ  is the expected complementary income.
We can readily show that 
e
2 θ  depends on population growth and on the wage rate:
2 2 1 2 L w L
e τ θ = , and the distribution parameter is expressed as:  ) 1 ( 2
1
2
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In a general setting, we may consider that the future wage increases because of
technical progress, given by the parameter µ, such that:  ). 1 (
1
2 µ + =
w
w
In a perfect foresight framework, excluding uncertainty of population growth and
technical progress, the payment accruing to an individual who subscribes to the social
security system is:
1 2 ) 1 )( 1 ( w n µ τ θ + + = .
The rate of return  ρ  of the contribution to the social security system is given by:
1 ) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 (
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, therefore  µ ρ + ≈ n .
Any agent will compare the rate of return ρ to the commodity interest rate r before
making a decision:  µ + ≤ n r  or  µ + ≥ n r .
In our initial problem, we assumed that µ = 0.
– If r > n, which is the case of a consumption-efficient programme, private saving
earns a higher rate of return. No agent is willing to pay contributions to the social
security system:  0 = τ .
– If r < n, the pay-as-you-go system is more attractive. The solution is to set  1 = τ
and therefore the agent may drop private saving.
– The case of r = n is an indeterminate solution.
The cases discussed above are corner solutions and much caution is recommended
when they are used to make decisions. It is not clear, for instance, in the case where
r > n whether or not the saving policy will drive the economy to the Golden Rule
steady state. These results are nevertheless good indications for the implementation of
economic policy.
4.3. The economic policy
Using the same parameters τ  and θ  as policy instruments, we define:
– τ  = the tax rate affecting the wages of the “young” generation, such that the tax
revenue equals:  t tL w τ .Capital accumulation ... 51
–  t θ  = the fixed amount distributed to every member of the “old” generation, such
that  . 1 t t t t L w L τ θ = −  Using equation (6), we can write θ  as  . ) 1 ( t t w n τ θ + =
Recall that this fixed amount is not the only income during the second period of
the life cycle of any agent. Workers, we mean the “young” generation, continue to
save and therefore earn an income in the next period. The intertemporal maximization
problem changes as (Problem III):
β β − =
1
2 1 max c c U
subject to:
w1 = marginal product of labour,
  1 1 1 ) 1 ( s w c − − = τ ,
2 1 2 2 ) 1 ( θ + + = s r c .
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When compared with equation (5), we notice that s1 now depends on the policy
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We can deduce the optimal taxation policy by setting 














) 1 ( . (15)
– If the equilibrium is the Golden Rule steady state, the capital–labor ratio equals
* * k , therefore the taxation rate  0 = τ . Private saving behaviour yields a consumption-
efficient steady state. There is no need for policy regulation. We have shown earlier
that this may be a rather exceptional outcome.J. HANNA 52
– If r < n, and over-accumulation prevails, then the pay-as-you-go pension scheme
helps to absorb excess saving through a positive taxation rate:  0 > τ . Hence, there is
a transfer from the younger generation towards the older one over the same period in
order to achieve optimality.
– Lastly, if r > n, the accumulation program is consumption-efficient, but still
saving (by the young) is insufficient and could be increased in order to boost the fu-
ture stream of consumption. We now must implement a negative rate of taxation
0 < τ ; that is, the transfer should be operating from the old generation towards the
younger one.
The overlapping generation model discussed above highlights the distribution is-
sues underlying capital accumulation. On the one hand, consumption-efficiency occurs
when agents rely on private saving to transfer wealth between the successive periods
of their life cycle. This “intra-generation” distribution mechanism fails because it
does not provide an adequate signal in guiding efficient allocation of resources for
future generations. On the other hand, an intergeneration transfer of income is con-
sistent with an optimal solution for capital accumulation only if private decisions
involve, besides individual rationality, some amount of “solidarity” between genera-
tions. When such a “social contract” is not effective, then some sort of regulation
must be implemented by public intervention. Taxation and distribution combine to
fulfil the optimal equilibrium conditions. The policy hinges on providing an optimal
mix of private saving and an appropriate share of a pay-as-you-go pension scheme.
5. Conclusion
The results and conclusions we are able to draw from the overlapping generation
model depend crucially on the exogenous constant saving rate assumption. The eco-
nomic agents transfer income over a short planning horizon while society evolves
indefinitely trough time.
There are alternative ways to transfer wealth as suggested by optimization growth
models. Following R.J. Barro [4], the representative agent, in intertemporal optimiza-
tion models, is assumed to be a family or a group of individuals linked to each other
through bequests. The time horizon is then infinite as individuals care about their
utility and about their children’s welfare. The utility function takes into account the























σ is the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution.Capital accumulation ... 53
Little work has been devoted to understanding the determinants of the discount
rate and the elasticity of substitution. If we knew why some societies or countries are
more or less impatient, or more willing to inter-temporally substitute consumption
than others are, we would then know what determines long run growth. The parame-
ters are always taken as given and, therefore, are not subject to policy action
2.
In optimal growth models, consumption-inefficiency due to excess saving does not
occur. Nevertheless the Modified Golden Rule ( δ + = n r ) solution yields a lower per
capita consumption level than its original Golden Rule counterpart. In spite of their
robust construction, which allows them to embrace a wide range of intricate problems,
the optimal growth models are not automatically best suited to deal with the funding
of pension schemes. The latter involve a finite time planning horizon for individuals
and a necessarily infinite horizon at the level of society.
The overlapping generation model captures this fundamental feature of the prob-
lem. It also reveals the necessity of public intervention in order to restore consistency
between rational decisions made by finite lived agents and long-run dynamics. The
saving rate is allowed to vary by appropriately manipulating the policy instruments.
The corrective fiscal policy is implemented in a flexible design featuring the transfer
of income in either direction between generations. The pension system then hinges on
an adequate balance between private saving and state-sponsored redistribution.
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Akumulacja kapitału, nakładające się pokolenia
oraz dynamiczna efektywność w finansowaniu funduszu emerytalnego
W krajach rozwiniętych kładzie się duży nacisk na schemat reformy systemu emerytalnego. Dowodzi
się konieczności dokonania zmian w sposobie oszczędzania indywidualnego w porównaniu do rozpo-
wszechnionego sposobu zliczania kosztów postępowania (pay-as-you-go) w systemie ubezpieczeń spo-
łecznych. Problem ten dyskutowany jest za pomocą modelu o nakładających się pokoleniach (overlap-
ping generations model). Z pracy wynika, że debata nad przeciwstawnymi sobie dwoma systemami
finansowania emerytur jest w pewnym stopniu zwodnicza. Z jednej strony, nieefektywność konsumpcji
(consumption-inefficiency) występuje w przypadku, gdy administratorzy polegają jedynie na transferze
oszczędności prywatnych w czasie trwania cyklu życia. Ten „wewnątrzpokoleniowy” mechanizm po-
działu załamuje się z braku adekwatnych sygnałów efektywnej alokacji zasobów dla przyszłych pokoleń.
Z drugiej strony, międzypokoleniowy podział dóbr jest zgodny z optymalnym rozwiązaniem jedynie
wówczas – przy dodatkowym założeniu racjonalności indywidualnej – kiedy istnieje pewna doza „soli-
darności” między pokoleniami.
W przypadku braku upowszechnienia takiego „kontraktu socjalnego” polityka podziału musi być upra-
womocniona przez „pośrednictwo państwa”. W pracy wykazano, że dla wszystkich rozwiązań o stabilnej
równowadze nierówność pomiędzy stopą zysku oszczędności prywatnych a stopą zysku, uzyskaną z mecha-
nizmu podziału międzypokoleniowego, zależy od preferencji w wyborze sposobu gromadzenia środków.
Postulowana jest elastyczność akcji politycznych, prowadzących do powiązania oszczędności prywatnych
z odpowiednim udziałem państwa w sponsorowaniu schematu ubezpieczeń. W pracy pokazano, że po-
przez wprowadzenie mechanizmu podatki/podział pomocnym w absorbowaniu przeważnie występującej
nadwyżki akumulacji jest system zliczania kosztów postępowania (pay-as-you-go). Polityka sprzyja przy
tym transferowi dochodów młodszych do starszych. Polityka ekonomiczna sprzyja także podniesieniu
niedostatecznego oszczędzania w przypadku, kiedy akumulacja kapitału spada poniżej złotej wartości
(Golden Rule). Z konkluzji wynika wybór transferu dobrobytu w przeciwnym kierunku. Opodatkowanie
dochodów starzejących się pokoleń wpływa na polepszenie opieki społecznej.
Słowa kluczowe: nakładające się pokolenia, efektywność konsumpcji, „złota wartość”, system ubezpie-
czeń społecznych oparty na zliczaniu kosztów postępowania